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Abstract 
We estimate an institutional production function to capture incentive induced growth in total factor productivity (TFP) 
of rice production in Bangladesh. The incentive component of TFP assists in explaining how farmers responded to the 
changes in incentives which were introduced during the major policy reforms undertaken in the 1980s and the 1990s.
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     1 Introduction
In this paper we examine the growth in Total Factor Productivity (TFP) of rice production in
Bangladesh and the growth in the incentive component of this TFP over three major agricultural
policy regimes, namely, the input subsidy regime, the output price support regime, and the liberal-
ized regime1. We investigate the incentive-induced growth in TFP where the incentive to exert more
e⁄ort is a result of market reforms. We capture the link between incentives and market reforms in
a simple framework that models farmers￿optimal response to changes in policy and institutions.
We follow the approach as in Hayami and Ruttan (1985), which McMillan, Whalley and Zhu
(1989) and Zhang and Carter (1997) explore to study agricultural productivity growth in China, and
Kompas (2005) applies to study the Vietnamese agriculture. Typically in transitional economies
factor and product prices increase at di⁄erent rates with market reforms. We characterize this
process through a weighted cost-share parameter of rice production: the ratio of average factor
to product prices. We compute this parameter over the three policy regimes. As is true for most
transitional economies, the value of such a cost-share parameter falls over time with market reforms
which in turns results in higher pro￿ts. We assume that farmers are pro￿t maximizers, therefore
they will choose an e⁄ort level that is optimal. We use the farmers￿optimal e⁄ort function in order
to transform a technical rice production function into what we call an institutional production
function that captures farmers￿optimal response to changes in institutions and policy. We estimate
this function using cross sectional data of 23 major rice producing districts of Bangladesh. We use
the estimated factor share parameters, other parameters of the model, and time series data of
factor and product prices to simulate the time path of TFP and its incentive component over the
three policy regimes, which in turns enables us to compare the TFP growth and the growth in the
incentive component of this TFP.
We ￿nd that rice farmers in Bangladesh, in general, respond to incentives, and deregulated
markets generally encourage farmers to exert more e⁄ort. Our study clearly shows that a major
source of productivity growth in Bangladesh agriculture is the incentive e⁄ects resulting from
market reforms.
2 The Context
We consult various issues of the Five-Year Plan documents of the Ministry of Finance and Planning
of the Government of Bangladesh in order to present a summary of the major agricultural policy
reforms in Bangladesh. Until 1982, farmers received subsidies to material inputs (but no subsidies
to wage) and in the wholesale agricultural market the highest quantity of rice they could sell in
one transaction was ￿xed. This phase of very low agricultural output growth, mainly due to a
low level of technology, can be characterized as one of traditional means of cultivation with heavy
dependence on weather and land fertility. This encouraged the government to adopt a new input
technology package that included high yield seeds and hybrid fertilizers. In addition, the government
introduced the output price support policy and abolished the quantity rationing system and direct
subsidies to material inputs. The main motivation behind these reforms was giving a boost to the
domestic agricultural production and the factor productivity.
1If rice production function is Q = Af (X1;X2;::::;Xn), where Q denotes total output of rice, Xis;i = 1;2;::::;n
denote the quantities of n inputs used in producing Q, Total Factor Productivity (TFP) of rice production, denoted
by A, is the portion of rice output not explained by the amounts of inputs used in production. As such, its level is
determined by how e¢ ciently and intensely the inputs are utilized in rice production.
1The government continued with the output price support policy until the late eighties. One
of the main reasons behind continuing with this policy was that the rate of increase in the price
of imported fertilizers and improved seeds was persistently higher than the rate of increase in the
market price of rice. This di⁄erence, allegedly, was mainly due to a heavily regulated channel of the
distribution of inputs. Given such issues in the distribution of inputs, having only the output price
support policy to boost agricultural production is generally ine⁄ective. With a view to improving
the channels of the distribution of inputs, the government decided to move towards deregulation.
Starting from 1990, the agricultural policy reforms undertaken in Bangladesh were mainly
regulatory reforms of the input supply chain and widening of the genetic base of crops. These
included liberalization of the input supply chains, crop diversi￿cation and extended research on rice
production. Instead of mono rice cropping, the government encouraged multi rice cropping and
round the year cropping of a wider variety of rice2. Other major reforms included the privatization
of supply of fertilizers and high yield seeds, management and distribution related reforms of fertilizer
and irrigation equipment, and a reform of the output price support policy. On the supply side, the
government introduced a policy that allows private traders to import diesel engines without taxes or
restrictions, couple these engines with domestic pumps and pipes, and sell the equipment to farmers
for irrigation. The government removed all duties and quotas on power tillers and pesticides. The
government also abolished all local as well as regional controls over fertilizer distribution and sales.
While such policy reforms stimulated private investment, other changes in government programs
related to agriculture also boosted public investment in agriculture.
In this paper we categorize these major agricultural policy reforms in Bangladesh in three policy
regimes over the period 1979-1998, namely, the input subsidy regime (1979-1981), the output
price support regime (1982-1989), and the liberalized regime (1990-1998). We estimate the rice
production function using cross sectional data of 23 major rice producing districts of Bangladesh
in a given year, 1997. We then use the estimated parameters from this model to simulate a TFP
index and an index of the incentive component of TFP in rice production over the sample period
1979-1998. This allows us to investigate the movement in TFP growth and growth in the incentive
component of TFP over the three policy regimes, which in turns explains how farmers have reacted
to changes in policy.
3 The Model
We assume that the production of rice requires four inputs: e⁄ective contribution of labour, land,
fertilizer and high yield seeds. The level of e⁄ort of a farmer is denoted by ", so that in a model
with N farmers, "N is the e⁄ective contribution of labour to output, measured in e¢ ciency units3.
With a0 2 (0;1) and ai 2 [0;1];i = 1;2;3;4, such that
4 P
i=1
ai = 1, the technical constant returns
to scale (CRTS) production function for rice is:





2Traditionally, the rice cropping season in Bangladesh is between March to September, i.e. the monsoon season.
During the nineties the government introduced new hybrids which can be cultivated throughout the year.
3In this model the variable e⁄ort includes everything that determines the quality of the farmers￿labour as well as
the willingness to exert more e⁄ort as a result of enhanced incentives to earn more by producing more.
2where Q;L;S and F denote total output of rice, land area under cultivation of rice, high yield seeds
and fertilizer used in producing rice. In per capita terms, the production function is
q = a0"a1la2sa3fa4 (2)
Let m denote farm income, such that
m = pq (3)
where p is the market price of rice. Farmers choose the least cost combination of inputs. The total







where ￿ > 0 is a constant, and wi;i = 1;2;3;4, denotes the price of input i. With the average real





i , the cost of production per farmer is:
C = ￿￿(w)q (5)
Let ! ￿
￿(w)
p , which is the ratio of the observed average input to product prices. With (3), the
farmer￿ s pro￿t function becomes:
￿ = pq (1 ￿ ￿!) (6)
Farmers utility is de￿ned over pro￿ts and e⁄ort, and they like the pro￿ts but dislike the e⁄ort of
hard work. Their utility function is:




with ￿ > 0; ￿ > 1. The e⁄ort disutility coe¢ cient, ￿, is analogous to the coe¢ cient of risk aversion.
Substituting from (2) and (6), we can write the farmers￿utility maximization problem as:
max
"




The optimal value of e⁄ort level satis￿es
("￿)
￿ = [￿p(1 ￿ ￿!)a0a1la2sa3fa4] (9)
where ￿ = (￿ ￿ a1). Notice here that the optimal e⁄ort level depends on, among others, the
parameters of the technical production function, (1), the output price of rice, the input prices and
the parameter ￿ which is related to the total cost of producing rice. Policy reforms and changes in
markets and institutions are re￿ ected in the output price of rice and the input prices, and observing
these prices the farmers choose their optimal e⁄ort level. We substitute (9) in (1) in order to derive
the institutional production function, i.e. the production function that captures farmers￿optimal













￿ ;￿2 = a2￿
￿ ;￿3 = a3￿
￿ and ￿4 = a4￿
￿ . We de￿ne A ￿ a
￿
￿
0 fa1p￿(1 ￿ ￿!)g
a1
￿ as the
total factor productivity (TFP) coe¢ cient of rice production. The institutional production function,
3(10), captures farmers￿optimal response to institutional arrangements and the government￿ s policy
reforms through the changes in output price, p, and the changes in ratio of observed average input to
product prices, !. Since these two a⁄ect the TFP coe¢ cient in the institutional production function,
changes in the TFP captures farmers￿optimal response to changes in policy and institutions.
With observable data, we estimate the institutional production function, (10). We use the CRTS
assumption, estimated ￿￿s;￿ = 1;2;3;4, and ￿ = (￿ ￿ a1) in order to pin down ai;i = 1;2;3;4, and
￿. We then use time series data on output price and input prices in order to compute ! and pin
down ￿. We decompose TFP from (10) into two components: the ￿rst component accounts for the
incentive e⁄ects as captured by the optimal e⁄ort level, or
Ainc = [p(1 ￿ ￿!)]
a1
￿ (11)









is an unexplained residual re￿ ecting the in￿ uence of a host of other factors, which are not
explicitly modelled. Although e⁄ort is not observable, empirical estimation of (1) and (10) is
actually very di⁄erent, and so are the ais and ￿￿s. We have already shown that because of the
e⁄ort disutility coe¢ cient ￿ and the share parameter a1, ais and ￿￿s are di⁄erent. In (10), we have
substituted out the e⁄ort variable with farmers￿optimal e⁄ort level. This enables one to rede￿ne
the TFP coe¢ cient and then decompose it into two components as in (11) and (12). If one estimates
the technical production function with obervable data, one would ignore farmers￿e⁄ort and the
optimal e⁄ort response to changes in policy and institutions, and the TFP coe¢ cient a0 would
simply be a constant which cannot be decomposed into incentive and unexplained components.
The key purpose of this paper is to compare the growth in TFP and the growth in the incentive
component of the TFP, for which the institutional production function is the speci￿cation that we
will estimate4.
4 Data and Estimation
We use cross sectional data of 23 major rice producing districts of Bangladesh in a normal cropping
year, 1997, (i.e. no ￿ oods or other shocks) in order to estimate (10). We have collected these data
from the Yearbook of Agricultural Statistics of Bangladesh, a publication of the Bangladesh Bureau
of Statistics5. The districts have similar cropping intensity. We also collect time series data on
country-wide aggregate production of rice, input use and input prices, and the average price of
rice from the same source. These data are for the period 1979-1998. We present a data appendix
that explains the variables we use. Summary statistics of the cross sectional data is in table 1 in
appendix. In ￿gure 1 and ￿gure 2 in appendix we present the time series data.
We present the results from Ordinary Least Squares estimation of the institutional production
function in appendix table 2. The estimated share coe¢ cients of labour, land, seeds and fertilizer
4In this paper, we only simulate A and Ainc in order to compare their growth over the three policy regimes.
Simulating Aother is not a purpose of this paper (since it tells nothing about the incentive-induced growth in TFP).
However, one can easily compute Aother since Aother =
A
Ainc.
5The other sources of agricultural data in Bangladesh are the Sustainable Development Network of Bangladesh
(SDNBD) and the Agricultural Statistical Yearbook of Bangladesh from the Ministry of Agriculture, both of which
are available online, and both use our data source.
4are 0:223;0:455;0:176 and 0:153, respectively, and these are statistically signi￿cant at 5% level.
Together with the estimates of ￿￿s, we use the 5 equations ￿1 =
a1(￿￿1)






i=1 ai = 1 in order to pin down a1 = 0:42;a2 = 0:33;a3 = 0:12;a4 = 0:11 and ￿ = 1:611.
With the time series data on input prices, we compute series of !, and using the time series data
and !, we pin down ￿ = 0:037.
We perform a number of diagnostic tests, and their summary is provided in appendix. All
tests of heteroscedasticity produced low values of the test statistics, and therefore we accept the
null hypothesis of homoscedasticity in the distribution of residuals. We conduct the Ramsey￿ s
standard test of speci￿cation error (i.e. the RESET). The test statistic for RESET is based on
R-squared values of the auxiliary and unrestricted regression models. All tests of Ramsey￿ s RESET
indicate that the hypothesis of no misspeci￿cation of the model could not be rejected at 5% level of
signi￿cance. We test the normality of the distribution of residuals using the standard Jarque-Bera
(JB) test, where we accept the normality assumption of the distribution of the residuals at 1%
level.
5 Total Factor Productivity with Policy Reforms
We use the time series data and the estimated share parameters from (10) in order to compute the
TFP as Solow residual for each of the years 1979-1998. We then compute the annual growth rate
of TFP (i.e. A). We compute the series of incentive component of TFP, given by (11), using the
pinned down parameter values of a1;￿ and ￿, the generated series of !, and the time series data of
output price. We then compute its year by year growth rate. We present the time path of TFP
and the incentive component of TFP in ￿gure 3, and the time path of their growth rates in ￿gure
4, in appendix.
We ￿nd some interesting results. Prior to the output price support policy period of 1982-1989,
under highly regulated market for inputs where price of inputs were subsidized, TFP growth rate
was negative. During this period, mainly because of the input price subsidy there was no incentives
for farmers to improve factor productivity. There was improvement in the growth of TFP during the
early phases of the output price support policy regime, when the growth rate achieved a highest (for
this regime) of 0.5% in 1984. However, after 1984 the growth rate fell, reached a record minimum
(-5.5%) in 1987, and stayed negative until 1990. The output price support policy therefore failed
to sustain the favourable impacts of the growth in factor productivity. Policy reforms in the 1990
which made input markets more liberalized and competitive brought in remarkable success. The
TFP growth rate became positive at the start of this regime, reached a new peak (2.7%) in 1993,
dropped to the negative zone in the following year, started to pick up thereafter and remained
positive during the last three years of our sample period.
We also present the time path of the incentive component of TFP in ￿gure 3, and the growth
in this component in ￿gure 4. There is clear evidence of incentive induced growth in TFP during
the output price support policy regime (peak 6.3% in 1984) and the current liberalized regime
(peak 6.02% in 1992). Over the sample period, the growth rate of the incentive component of
TFP reached a record minimum of -3.2% in 1983, which could be due to the political unrest in
Bangladesh during the early eighties. The negative growth rate (-1.7%) in the incentive component
of TFP in 1989 could be due to the heavy ￿ ood of 1988 which resulted in huge crop damage. The
overall trend of the growth rate in the incentive component of TFP is quite interesting, because it
5clearly shows that farmers in general respond strongly to policy reforms, and deregulated markets
for output and inputs encourage farmers to exert more e⁄ort.
When input prices were subsidized and quantity was rationed (until 1982), farmers had no
incentive to increase productivity. The growth rate of TFP and the growth rate of its incentive
component experienced a boost with the introduction of the output price support policy and the
removal of direct subsidies to material inputs. During this phase of policy reforms, agricultural
factor markets became relatively more competitive and prices of all inputs experienced high growth
(see ￿gure 2). This growth was accompanied by a high growth of incentive-induced productiv-
ity. Due to the liberalization of the input markets, which started in 1990, agricultural markets
became more competitive which resulted in high growth in TFP and high growth in the incentive
component of TFP. During this phase, ￿ at subsidies and direct price support were replaced by
more e⁄ective incentive devices, such as privatization of fertilizer and seed supply, ￿scal waivers
on licensing, institutional reforms such as the introduction of transferability of supply licenses (at
market determined price), strategic land management schemes and increased volume of agricultural
research.
Our results indicate that no matter how informal the agricultural labour market in Bangladesh
is, farmers in general respond sensibly to policy reforms that are directed towards generating more
incentives for enhanced factor productivity. There is, of course, a component of TFP which our
study does not explain. This component can be accounted for unexplained factors that contribute
to TFP.
6 Concluding Remarks
We use a simple optimizing model and study empirically rice production in Bangladesh based on
an institutional production function which captures not only the standard technical relationship
between inputs and output, but also the optimal e⁄ort response to the institutional as well as the
market arrangements within which farmers work. Assuming that farmers choose their e⁄ort levels
optimally, we show that one can compute these incentive e⁄ects at each stage of the reforms and
compare them with the overall change in TFP. We ￿nd that decomposing the incentive component
of TFP in Bangladesh agriculture assists a great deal in explaining farmers￿response to incentives.
Our results clearly show that during the most recent phase of policy reforms there has been a steady
increase in the incentive component of TFP of rice production in Bangladesh.
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Data Appendix
The rice output data is aggregate rice production data in tonnes, totalling all production of three
major hybrids of rice produced in Bangladesh throughout the year, namely, Aus, Aman and Boro.
Production of all varieties of these hybrids (local, transplanted and broadcast) are aggregated for
total production of a particular category of hybrid, and all production of particular hybrid categories
are aggregated for the aggregate district and national production of rice for cross sectional and time
series data. Labour is measured as person-days and is obtained by multiplying average person-days
per hectare in agriculture by the rice cultivated area divided by 300 days or one standard labour
unit in one year. We measure the porportion of land that is used for rice production by de￿ ating
land area (in hectares) under rice cultivation by the total land area (in hectares) available for
cropping throughout the year. This fraction, both for di⁄erent districts and for the country-wide
level, was used to transform other input variables for per hectare input usage. Seed is calculated
from the average use of hybrid seeds (in tonnes) multiplied by the proportion of land under rice
cultivation. In this way we get how much seeds are used per hectare. Fertilizer is calculated from
the average amounts of major hybrid fertilizer, namely, Urea, TSP, SSP and ASP, used per hectare
in rice production. Time series data for price of rice for 1979-1998 is collected from the survey of
Bangladesh Rice Research Institute in di⁄erent years and the database of SDNBD. The price of rice
is the average annual wholesale price of popular hybrids, valued in taka (Bangladeshi currency) per
mound (a rural unit of measurement of quantity of rice, and 1 mound=40 kg). Chemical fertilizer
price and seeds price are in taka per kg. Wage rate is the total of average wage rates (without
meal) for male and female workers. The land rental price is the amount of money (in taka) farmers
have to give to the land owner for each mound produced in one hectare of land during a cropping
season.
Appendix: Tables and ￿gures
Table 1: Summary statistics of district level rice output and inputs (23 districts, 1997)
Variable Description Mean (SD) Min Max
Output Rice production in district i (in 000 tonnes) 93.78 (21.77) 2.4 211.66
Land Area (under rice cropping) in district i (in 000 hectares) 437.88 (16.49) 15.87 621.23
Seed Improved seeds in district i (in 000 tonnes) 124.04 (22.11) 20.78 299.02
Fertilizer Fertilizer in district i (in 000 tonnes) 72,054.02 (105.05) 2643.16 1,12,211
Labour Labour in district i (in 000 work days) 3.48 (0.775) 1.802 6.15
7Table 2: OLS estimation results (Dependent variable: lnQ)
Variable Estimate (s.e.) p-value
constant 0.377 (0.6703) 0.580
ln(labour) 0.220 (0.1009) 0.042
ln(land) 0.455 (0.0885) 0.000
ln(seeds) 0.176 (0.0600) 0.009
ln(fertilizer) 0.153 (0.0624) 0.024
R-squared 0.9711
R-squared adjusted 0.9626
S.E. of estimation 0.2203
Table 3: Summary of likelihood ratio test for CRTS and the Jarque-Bera test
Null hypothesis Test statistic Critical value Decision
￿1+￿2+￿3+￿4= 1 (CRTS) 4.69 6.6349 Accept null
Normal distribution of OLS residuals 7.7649 9.21 Accept null




￿2 statistic Critical ￿2 at 5% level Decision
u on b Q 0.221 3.8414 Accept null
u2 on b Q 0.199 3.8414 Accept null
u2 on ln b Q 0.241 3.8414 Accept null
B-P-G test 6.520 9.4877 Accept null
Harvey test 3.398 9.4877 Accept null
Glejser test 5.136 9.4877 Accept null
Table 5: Ramsey RESET speci￿cation test (null hypothesis: model correctly speci￿ed)
F statistic Critical F at 5% level Decision
RESET(2) 0.5378 4.45 Accept null
RESET(3) 0.3446 4.49 Accept null
RESET(4) 0.2232 4.54 Accept null




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4: Growth in TFP (A) and the incentive component of TFP (Ainc), 1980-1998
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